Abstract-In multiparty collaborative data mining, participants contribute their own data sets and hope to collaboratively mine a comprehensive model based on the pooled data set. How to efficiently mine a quality model without breaching each party's privacy is the major challenge. In this paper, we propose an approach based on geometric data perturbation and data mining service-oriented framework. The key problem of applying geometric data perturbation in multiparty collaborative mining is to securely unify multiple geometric perturbations that are preferred by different parties, respectively. We have developed three protocols for perturbation unification. Our approach has three unique features compared to the existing approaches: 1) with geometric data perturbation, these protocols can work for many existing popular data mining algorithms, while most of other approaches are only designed for a particular mining algorithm; 2) both the two major factors: data utility and privacy guarantee are well preserved, compared to other perturbationbased approaches; and 3) two of the three proposed protocols also have great scalability in terms of the number of participants, while many existing cryptographic approaches consider only two or a few more participants. We also study different features of the three protocols and show the advantages of different protocols in experiments.
ECENT advances in computing, communication, and digital storage technologies have enabled incredible volumes of data to be accessible remotely across geographical and administrative boundaries. There is an increasing demand on collaborative mining over the distributed data stores to find the patterns or rules that benefit all of the participants. For example, multiple retailer stores in the same business section want to pool their data together to determine the characteristics of customer purchases. Cancer research institutes in different geographical areas need to collaboratively find the environmental factors related to certain type of cancer. However, these distributed data sets could also contain sensitive information, such as business sales data and patient clinical records. Therefore, an important challenge for distributed collaborative mining is how to protect each participant's sensitive information, while still finding useful data models (classification models, for example).
The service-oriented infrastructure for collaborative mining of data distributed has become the most popular solution [2] , [27] , where the data providers are the collaborators who submit their own data sets to the designated data mining service provider for discovering and mining the commonly interested models on the pooled data. This model reduces the high communication cost associated with most cryptographic approaches [17] , [13] . In this paper, we will study the problem of privacy-preserving multiparty collaborative data mining using geometric data perturbation under this service-based framework.
Geometric data perturbation has unique benefits [5] , [7] for privacy-preserving data mining. First, many popular data mining models are invariant to geometric perturbation. For example, the classifiers: kernel methods (including k-nearestneighbor (KNN) classifier), linear classifiers, and supportvector-machine (SVM) classifiers [11] , are invariant to geometric perturbation in the sense that the classifiers trained on the geometrically perturbed data have almost the same accuracy as those mined with the original raw data. This conclusion is also valid for most popular clustering algorithms based on euclidean distance [14] . Second, multiple geometric data perturbation can be easily generated with low cost, each of which preserves about the same model accuracy. Thus, an individual data provider needs only to select one perturbation that can provide satisfactory privacy guarantee. Comparing with other existing approaches to privacypreserving data mining, geometric data perturbation significantly reduces the complexity in balancing data utility and data privacy guarantee [2] , [8] .
When applying geometric data perturbation to multiparty collaborative mining, the above advantages are inherited. In addition, due to the service-based framework, the collaboration can scale up conveniently in most cases, while many cryptographic protocols are limited to a small number of parties [17] , [13] , [26] .
The key challenge for applying geometric data perturbation to multiparty collaborative data mining is to securely unify the perturbations used by different data providers, while each party still gets satisfactory privacy guarantee and the utility of the pooled data is well preserved. There are three important factors that impact the quality of unified perturbation: the privacy guarantee of each data set, the utility of the pooled data, and the efficiency of the perturbation unification protocol. We consider these factors in developing the following three protocols for perturbation unification: the simple protocol, the negotiation protocol, and the space adaptation protocol. Analytical and experimental results show that the space adaptation protocol is the most efficient protocol with great scalability, while the negotiation protocol can provide better privacy guarantee with some additional cost.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: We give the concepts and related issues in geometric perturbation in Section 2 for better understanding of the paper. In Section 3, we will briefly review the multiparty framework and address the problem of perturbation unification under this framework. In Section 4, we present the three protocols and analyze their cost and privacy guarantee. The related factors in these protocols are further studied in experiments (Section 5).
PRELIMINARY
In this section, we will introduce basic concepts in geometric perturbation for better understanding of the paper. The primary focus will be on the related issues in the scenario of single data provider-a single data provider releases the perturbed data to the service provider or to the public for mining purpose. By convention, we will use capital characters to represent matrices and bold lower cases to represent vectors.
Geometric Perturbation and Privacy Protection
We first briefly describe the basic geometric perturbation method, with which the participants of collaborative mining will perturb their own private data set before releasing it to other parties.
We define a geometric perturbation as a combination of random rotation perturbation, random translation perturbation, and noise addition. Without loss of generality, it can be represented as GðXÞ ¼ RX þ É þ Á, where X denotes the original data set with N rows and d columns and we sometimes also denote X by X dÂN , R is a random orthonormal matrix [21] , and É is a random translation matrix. We define a random translation matrix as follows:
. . . ; t d 0 ð0 t i 1, 1 i dÞ, and
t is randomly generated based on the uniform distribution over [À1; 1]. Á is a noise matrix with independent identically distributed (i.i.d., with zero mean and small variance) elements, which is used to perturb the distances so that the perturbation is resilient to certain kind of attacks. If É 1 and É 2 are translation matrices and R is an orthogonal transformation, it is easy to verify that É 1 AE É 2 and RÉ i are also translation matrices.
While it is delicate to find an appropriate R in terms of the resilience to attacks, both t and the noise component of GðXÞ can be generated independently. In initial investigation, Á with some general setting, such as Gaussian Nð0; 2 Þ and ¼ 0:1, can provide satisfactory resilience to the identified attacks, and still maintain high model accuracy [7] .
In previous work [5] , geometric perturbation is specially designed for a family of "geometric transformation invariant classifiers," including KNN, kernel methods, linear classifiers, and SVM classifiers with the commonly used kernels. However, more mining models can be added to this list, including most clustering models. The major benefit of such a transformation is: for a given data set, all geometric perturbations can give similar model accuracy for these classifiers; thus, an individual data provider needs to select only one perturbation that can provide satisfactory privacy guarantee. We next define what is a "good" perturbation in terms of privacy guarantee.
Privacy guarantee for multidimensional perturbation. Geometric perturbation is a multidimensional data perturbation. In contrast to single-dimension data perturbation [2] , data in all columns are perturbed together in a multidimensional transformation. Thus, the privacy guarantee of an individual data column is correlated to the privacy guarantee of other columns. We define the privacy guarantee of a multidimensional perturbation as follows.
Let C i be a random variable representing the normalized data of column i in the original data set so that the values across the d columns are comparable (1 i d). Let O i be a random variable representing the observed data of column i, which can be the perturbed data or the data reconstructed from the perturbed data by particular attacks. Both C i and O i are normalized so that scaling will not artificially increase the privacy guarantee. We use p i to denote the privacy guarantee on column i and define p i by the standard deviation of the difference between O i and C i , namely, p i ¼ stdevðO i À C i Þ. If both O i and C i are normalized to [0, 1]. Fig. 1 gives an intuitive understanding of p i .
Furthermore, let the significance of privacy protection for each column have a normalized weight w i , we define two basic composite metrics by comparing p i =w i across all d columns: 
where È 1 is called the Minimum Privacy Guarantee, which defines the lowest privacy guarantee that a column should have with the given perturbation and È 2 is called the Average Privacy Guarantee, which defines the average privacy guarantee over all d columns. In the sequel, we will use È 1 to represent the "privacy guarantee" of a perturbation. Attack analysis and perturbation optimization. In optimizing geometric perturbation, we also need to consider the resilience to attacks. We identify three categories of attacks to geometric perturbation, according to the amount of external knowledge the attacker may have [7] : 1) Naive-estimation attack is the first category, where attackers have no additional knowledge about the original data, so they simply estimate the original records from the perturbed data. 2) Independent Component Analysis (ICA)-based attack is the second category of attacks. When attackers know some column statistics, such as the maximum/minimum values and the probability density function of each column, they can try to reconstruct the original data set with ICA techniques. The effectiveness of ICA-based attack is determined by the property of the original data set. We can find a good perturbation resilient to ICA attack in most cases. 3) Distance-inference attack is the third category of attack. If the attacker knows enough number of original data records and their maps in the perturbed data set, they can use this kind of knowledge to break geometric perturbation. The noise component Á in geometric perturbation is used to perturb the distance relationship and make the perturbation resilient to the distance-inference attack. Initial experiments show that low noise intensity can satisfactorily reduce the accuracy of distance-inference attack and still preserve the desired model accuracy.
A randomized perturbation optimization algorithm [7] is designed for finding a good perturbation with satisfactory resilience to the discussed attacks. In general, compared to randomly generated perturbations (the components R, É, Á are randomly selected), the optimized perturbation can give significantly higher privacy guarantee. This optimization algorithm will also be used in our multiparty protocols.
MULTIPARTY MINING SERVICE FRAMEWORK
In this section, we give an overview of the data-mining-as-aservice framework for multiparty collaborative data mining. We will focus the discussion on the issues in applying geometric perturbation to multiparty mining under this framework. First, we will briefly introduce the involved parties in the framework, and then give the major issues of applying geometric perturbation to the multiparty scenario.
Overview and Threat Model
Service computing is becoming a major paradigm in distributed computing and business processing. Since data mining is a resource-intensive task, involving highly centralized expertise and computing power, it can be a valuable service supported by the companies or the research institutes that have abundant resources. Interested in finding valuable global models, multiple parties can use such data mining services by providing restrictive sharing of their data. One of the major concerns in collaborative mining is preserving the sensitive information for each participating data provider, while maintaining high quality of the mined models (or the utility of the pooled data). Fig. 2 shows the parties and the possible interactions between them. The service provider (S) is a party who owns abundant computing power, data mining tools and talents, and willing to offer their data mining services to the contracted parties through certain service provision scheme.
All data providers (notated by P i ) provide their own data which may contain sensitive information and they are willing to collaboratively find global models. Besides the two kinds of parties, sometimes, trusted servers or semitrusted commodity servers [4] may also be used. However, in this paper, we do not assume that trusted parties are present because they are difficult to find in practice.
In this paper, we assume a semihonest threat model for all parties. A party is said to be semihonest if she will honestly follow the multiparty interaction protocol agreed upon by all the participants in the protocol, but she might be curious about any potentially private information contained in the intermediate results that she receives.
By assuming a semihonest threat model, we do not consider the scenarios where either the service provider or any of data providers is malicious. Malicious adversaries may do anything to infer secret information. They can abort the protocol at any time, send spurious messages, spoof messages, collude with other (malicious) parties, etc.
We believe that the semihonest assumption is realistic for secure and privacy-preserving multiparty computing. For example, consider the case where credit card companies jointly build data mining models for credit card fraud detection, which need to share the credit card fraud transactions. Such sharing is typically controlled by managing to whom and at what extent such sharing will take place. It is more realistic to assume that the players (the credit card companies) are not malicious but semihonest in nature. More importantly, in this type of scenarios, protocols developed under the semihonest threat model enable the participants to collaboratively perform data mining models without considering the insider attacks.
In addition, most of existing research on secure and privacy-preserving computing assumes semihonest model where the players may exhibit malicious behavior in limited context given that the admission to participate in a planned distributed collaboration is to some extent controlled in most of the real-world applications. Many of the previous multiparty computational protocols are based on this assumption, such as secure multiparty computation [10] , multiparty privacy-preserving association rule mining [23] , [15] , multiparty decision tree mining [17] , and multiparty k-means clustering [24] .
Note that in multiparty environment, anonymization might also become a key factor in privacy preservation. In many cases, the private information becomes valuable to the privacy attacker only when the owner of the private information is identified. However, we will not consider anonymization in the current version.
The semihonest model in this paper is also relaxed-the assumption of no collusion between any parties is not strictly held. The design of our protocols allows the collusion between data providers. However, the service provider should not collude with any of the data providers. Otherwise, the protocols may become too complicated and costly (we will discuss this later).
In our threat model, passive logging and eavesdropping over the network are possible. Therefore, encryption is needed for transmitting secrets. In the rest of the paper, we will focus on the potential privacy breaches via the transmitted data sets and parameters that a party can normally decrypt and see in the protocol, which are mainly caused by the curious service provider, the curious data providers, and the collusive data providers.
Why Do We Need to Unify Perturbations
With geometric perturbation, each data provider can employ the geometric perturbation algorithm to obtain a locally optimized perturbation regarding to its own data set. However, if we want to use all data sets for mining, we still need to unify all data sets under one perturbation. We will discuss the reason why we need perturbation unification.
A geometric transformation changes the coordinates of the data points, i.e., transforms data points in one coordinate system to another, while preserving the distance information that is critical to the applicable mining models. When data sets are transformed differently, although the distance information is preserved within a particular data set, it is not preserved crossing different data sets. There might exist multiple ways to preserve distance between data sets, but we will use perturbation unification in this paper to address this problem.
Let the original vector space V 0 denote a d-dimensional data space. By using the geometric perturbation G i , we transform the vector space V 0 to any target space V t . For clear presentation, in the rest of the paper, we use the geometric perturbation G i to represent the transformed vector space V i , and the "vector space" is equivalent to the "data space" as well. Let fX 1 ; X 2 ; . . . ; X k g denote the subdata sets in V 0 , each of which is held by one of the k data providers P i (1 i k), respectively. Let G i be the transformation used by the data provider P i . Clearly, the following are true:
. If G i 6 ¼ G j , directly merging the transformed data sets G i ðX i Þ and G j ðX j Þ will break the distance relationship between the original data sets X i and X j . . Assume the models M i and M i depending on the distance information. If M i is trained with G i ðX i Þ and M j with G j ðX j Þ, G i 6 ¼ G j , then M i and M j are not compatible due to unpreserved distance relationship between G i and G j . Let G t be the target unified space. One straightforward method is to make G i ¼ G t or indirectly transform G i to G t for any party i. It is then equivalent to directly transforming the pooled original data X to G t ðXÞ, as in the single-party scenario. The following protocols use these unification methods.
PROTOCOLS FOR PERTURBATION UNIFICATION
In this section, we develop three protocols: the simple protocol, the negotiation protocol, and the space adaptation protocol. All of them are good candidates for certain application scenarios. We will address the problems and advantages associated with each protocol. In the following discussion, the service provider will also provide a public key for encrypting the data that only the service provider can decrypt. We will skip some common steps for all protocols, steps such as mining on the pooled data at the server side and applying the mined model to new data by the data provider.
Simple Protocol
The first protocol is quite simple, yet presenting some basic components that will also be used in other protocols. In this protocol, the data providers use the same randomly generated perturbation to perturb data. The basic issues include: 1) how to securely generate the same random perturbation in each site, while preventing the curious service provider knowing the unified perturbation and 2) how to prevent privacy breach caused by curious data providers.
The first issue can be addressed by the group-key-based random perturbation generation. The data providers share the same random seed (the group key) to generate the same perturbation locally. There are abundant literatures on group key management [3] , so we will skip the details here. The perturbed data cannot be delivered to the service provider directly, since the network is not secure and other data providers can log the transmitted data and recover the original data with the known perturbation. Thus, the perturbed data have to be encrypted with the public key provided by the service provider before it goes to public. 1 The service provider decrypts the perturbed data with her private key and pools the data together to mine a unified model. The unified model is returned to the data providers. Since the unified model is in the perturbed space, before the data provider applies it to the new data, she needs to transform her new data with the unified perturbation. The mining procedure and the model application procedure will be the same for all protocols. We will skip them in later discussions.
Apparently, there are a few weaknesses with this simple protocol. First of all, random perturbation may not provide same privacy guarantee for all data providers. We will study the difference between the distributions of privacy guarantee provided by random perturbation and locally optimized perturbation in experiments. Second, encryption makes the data exclusively used in the current collaboration, and any of the perturbed data sets cannot be easily shared by the public or reused in other collaborations. Data providers may need to maintain multiple versions of perturbed data for different uses, which increases the maintenance cost.
Negotiation Protocol
Bearing the first weakness of the simple protocol in mind, the negotiation protocol aims at improving the overall privacy guarantee for all data providers. Some data providers may not be satisfied with the randomly generated perturbation in the simple protocol in terms of privacy guarantee. In the negotiation protocol, each data provider has a chance to review the candidate perturbation and vote for or against the candidate.
Due to different data distributions of the locally owned data set, a data provider may prefer a different locally optimal perturbation than other perturbations possibly preferred by another data provider. Chances are slim that one perturbation works optimally for all data providers. The data providers may need to accept some suboptimal perturbations eventually. To evaluate the "satisfaction level" of a unified perturbation to the data provider, we define the following metric: Definition 2. Assume that the locally optimized perturbation G i gives privacy guarantee p o i for data provider P i and the unified perturbation G t gives p i . The satisfaction level for P i is defined by
In the negotiation protocol, the agreement on the unified perturbation is reached by voting and negotiation. Each data provider P i sets her own "minimum satisfaction level" s min i
, which is the lower bound that a global perturbation is acceptable to the data provider. Then, each of the k data providers nominates her locally optimal perturbation, encrypts it by the group key, and distributes it to the other k À 1 parties. At each party P i , the k À 1 candidate perturbations from other parties are evaluated and labeled with "accepted/rejected" according to the lower bound s min i p o i . Let p ij be the privacy guarantee given by the perturbation G j from P j . P i 's vote to G j is defined as follows:
( When all parties return 1 to the party P i , G i is accepted by all parties. In whatever situation, P i has to broadcast either her own perturbation is globally agreed or not. If multiple perturbations are agreed by all parties, only the one with the lowest party ID is used as the global perturbation. If no perturbation is agreed on, another round of negotiation starts.
The major issue is how efficient the negotiation process is in terms of the setting of local minimum satisfaction level. Apparently, a loose setting, i.e., a low local minimum satisfaction, will lead to fast agreements. Therefore, there is a trade-off between the level of privacy guarantee and the efficiency of negotiation. We will further study this tradeoff in experiments. Fig. 3 demonstrates the interactions in the protocol.
Space Adaptation Protocol
The negotiation protocol can increase the overall privacy guarantee of the unified perturbation. However, the interactions between the parties are heavyweight, and still the perturbed data have to be encrypted before distribution.
This step of encryption also makes the perturbed data exclusively used for the service provider in the current collaboration. Thus, the additional cost in maintaining different version of perturbed data sets still exists. In this section, we propose the third protocol, the space adaptation (SA) protocol, which inherits the convenience of distributing data in the single-party scenario, while also reduces the cost of communication, encryption, and maintenance.
The space adaptation approach is based on the fact that geometric perturbations are transformable. We define the transformation of perturbation G i to G t as G i!t , the "Space Adpator", if G t is the target perturbation. G t can be represented as the composition of G i and G i!t : G t ¼ G i G i!t . Specifically, for a given data set X,
Note if G i or G t also contains a noise component, this equation becomes an approximation.
Although the overall satisfaction level to the unified perturbation is at the same level of the simple protocol, there are a few advantages by using the space adaptation protocol. In the space adaptation protocol, the data provider can simply distribute G i ðXÞ without encryption, plus the encrypted space adaptor G i!t for the particular collaboration. This brings considerable flexibility since G i ðXÞ can be released to the public and be reused by future collaborations as well. While keeping the locally optimally perturbed data published and unchanged, the data provider just needs to change the space adaptor and encrypt it for different multiparty collaborative applications. With the combination of negotiation protocol, the overall satisfaction level can be improved as well. We will first give the detailed concept of space adaptation, and then describe the protocol.
Concept of space adaptation. As we discussed earlier, the perturbation parameters for the data provider i are G i : ðR i ; t i Þ, the translation matrix is É i ¼ t i 1 t ni , and the original subdata set is X i . Let Y i be the perturbed data. Now, suppose that we want to transform Y i to Y i!t in the target space G t : ðR t ; t t Þ that has no noise component. The following procedure can be applied. Since 
This equation consists of three components. We define the first component R t R
À1 i
as the rotation component of the adaptor R i!t . Apparently, R t R À1 i É i is still a translation matrix (referring to the Definition 1), and thus, we name 
i.e., the transformed noise component has the same distribution with Á i . As this component is used to complement (de-randomize) the random noise in G i , removing this component will exactly inherit the noise component of
Therefore, we can reformulate space adaptation as follows:
We define the two components < R i!t ; É i!t > as the space adaptor G i!t from G i to G t . Clearly, by knowing that the data provider is perturbed data Y i ¼ G i ðX i Þ and its space adaptor G i!t , one can transform the data to the target space.
With space adaptation, we split the perturbation into two parts: the perturbed data and the space adaptors that are used to transform the perturbed data to the global perturbation. This split brings two unique advantages: 1) the perturbed data can be safely released to any of the parties in terms of privacy preservation and 2) only small encryption cost is needed to safely transmit the space adaptors.
Protocol. With space adaptation, now each data provider needs to publish two components: the perturbed data G i ðX i Þ and the space adaptor G i!t . The perturbed data are generated by using the locally optimized privacy guarantee, which is only known by the data provider. Therefore, the data can be directly published without encryption. The space adaptor can be used to recover the original perturbation by other data providers, since every data provider knows the unified perturbation. Therefore, the space adaptor G i!t is only allowed to be known by the service provider. In other words, G i!t has to be encrypted with the service provider's public key.
1. The same group-key-based procedure that we have presented in the simple protocol is applied to set up the randomly generated unified perturbation G t .
2.
Each data provider generates the perturbation that is locally optimized for their own data, notated by G i . With G t and G i , G i!t can be calculated according to the definition. 3. Each data provider publishes G i ðX i Þ and transmits the encrypted G i!t to the service provider. 4. The service provider decrypts the encrypted space adaptors and applies it to the corresponding perturbed data, which transforms the data to the unified space G t . Then, the service provider can pool the data sets and train a unified model. Fig. 4 shows the components and interactions in the space adaptation protocol.
Performance Analysis
One of the major issues in multiparty computation is the cost, including the communication cost and the encryption(decryption) cost. In addition, we consider the reusability of the perturbed data, which saves the cost of future use of the data set, as a part of performance analysis. In the following analysis, we calculate the cost of communication and encryption based on the data unit, e.g., a floating-point unit. Table 1 summarizes these metrics for the three protocols. Assume that each party provides approximately the same number of records, say n records, each record has d dimensions, and there are k data providers in total. Let the average cost of local optimization for the data set of above size be . In the negotiation protocol, with certain setting, the average number of negotiation rounds is r.
For the simple protocol, the communication cost consists of the maintenance of group key [3] , which is OðkÞ, and the transmission cost of data, which is OðkndÞ. Since this protocol does not locally optimize perturbations, there is no cost in local optimization. Encryption is required to transmit the data, which cost OðkndÞ in total. The perturbed data are exclusively used in a single collaboration task. The data provider may need to provide another locally optimized perturbed data for public access. 
TABLE 1 Cost Analysis for the Three Protocols
For the negotiation protocol, it requires maximum r rounds to get the agreed perturbation, r agreed by the parties. In each round, k perturbation parameters (Oðd 2 Þ for each) are broadcast, which contributes to the communication cost Oðk 2 d 2 Þ. The perturbation parameter is also encrypted in the broadcast, i.e., Oðkd 2 Þ. In each round, each data provider will also perform local optimization once. Similar to the simple protocol, the perturbed data are not reusable.
The space adaptation protocol is the most efficient one. The communication cost is the same as the simple protocol, since both depend on group key for generating the unified perturbation. Each data provider needs to generate local optimal perturbation once, and only the space adaptors (Oðd 2 Þ units) need to be encrypted. Furthermore, the perturbed data can be reused for other purpose, which greatly decrease the maintenance cost.
Overall, the negotiation protocol has the highest cost, which might also results in lower scalability. We will study the scalability issue in terms of the setting of satisfaction level.
Discussion on Risk of Privacy Breach
We first give a conceptual order of the overall satisfaction level of privacy guarantee provided by the three protocols, and then analyze the risk of privacy breach for each protocol. Finally, we discuss whether any collusion will increase the risk of privacy breach either between data providers or between the service provider and data providers.
The simple protocol and the space adaptation protocol employ a randomly generated unified perturbation, while the negotiation protocol optimizes the unified perturbation to some extent. Therefore, the ordering of overall satisfaction level can be roughly represented as follows: s Simple ; s SA < s Negotiation :
Note that the negotiation protocol can be used to generate the agreed perturbation for the space adaptation protocol to increase the overall satisfaction level, which, however, will limit the scalability of the protocol.
Risk of privacy breach. The risk of privacy breach for different protocols can be investigated through two types of adversaries: One is the curious data providers and the other is the curious service provider. We look at each protocol separately.
In the simple protocol, the data provider transmits encrypted perturbed data to the service provider, thus curious data providers cannot figure out any useful information from eavesdropping. The random perturbation is locally generated with the same algorithm, according to the shared seed, i.e., the group key sent by the service provider. If each party honestly follows the protocol, the curious data providers cannot find any information from the shared perturbation. The service provider can see all perturbed data sets submitted by the data providers. Since random perturbation does not guarantee that all parties get high satisfaction level, the risk of privacy breach caused by the curious service provider might be higher for some data provider than others. The individual risk can be evaluated by the satisfaction level locally. If the data provider is not comfortable with certain satisfaction level, she can refuse to attend the collaboration.
The negotiation protocol enables multiround voting to reach an agreed perturbation. In each round of negotiation, a data provider sees the perturbation parameters preferred by other data providers and their Boolean votes to her perturbation. Since the perturbed data from other parties are all encrypted, without knowing the perturbed data, the curious data provider cannot utilize the perturbation parameters and Boolean votes to breach privacy. As the result of negotiation, the unified perturbation is approved by all parties. Therefore, the risk from the curious service provider is greatly reduced, compared to the simple privacy.
If the space adaptation protocol uses random perturbation as the agreed perturbation, the risk of privacy breach from the curious service provider is similar to the simple protocol. Now, the data providers can see the published perturbed data, which were perturbed with locally optimized perturbation. Thus, the risk from curious data providers as well as any unknown public privacy attackers is minimized. The space adapters are all encrypted so that curious data providers cannot utilize them.
Discussion on collusion. For all three protocols we discussed, we do not allow the collusion between the service provider and any of the data providers. If this type of collusion happens, the current protocols will not work. The service provider can exactly recover all original data sets, if she knows the unified perturbation G t , which can be provided by the colluded data provider. Can we revise the protocols and make them resilient to this type of collusion? Probably, but the cost may increase dramatically. The key point to make this collusion ineffective is to prevent data providers knowing the unified perturbation G t as well. To achieve this, we may need a trusted server to take care of the perturbation unification. Since the data provider does not know G t , she would not be able to use the mined model locally. Therefore, the trusted party may also need to involve in model application. Without a better solution, simply revised protocols will put too much burden to the trusted party. We will leave this challenging issue for the future study. Table 2 summarizes the risk of privacy breach for the proposed three protocols in terms of different types of attacks.
However, with the three protocols, the collusion between two data providers will not increase the risk of privacy breach of other data providers. In the simple protocol and the negotiation protocol, one data provider cannot see another's perturbed data since the data are encrypted. Therefore, collusion between two data providers brings no additional information of the third data provider. In the space adaptation protocol, two components are published: one is the data perturbed with a locally optimized perturbation, known by no party except the data owner, and the other is the encrypted space adaptor, which can be decrypted by only the data owner and the service provider. Collusion will not provide additional information of the third data provider. Therefore, collusion between data providers will not increase the risk of privacy breach in the space adaptation protocol as well.
EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we present four sets of experiments on evaluating the effectiveness of the proposed three protocols (simple, negotiation, and space adaptation). The first set of experiments shows the difference between locally optimized perturbations and randomly selected perturbations. The second set studies the relationship between the setting of minimum satisfaction level and the efficiency of negotiation in the negotiation protocol. The third set compares the satisfaction level between the protocols. Finally, the fourth set of experiments shows the preservation of model accuracy by using these protocols.
Setting of Experiments
The perturbation optimization algorithm used by each data provider uses the fastICA implementation 2 to test the resilience of the candidate perturbation to the ICAbased attacks [7] . We use two representative classifiers: KNN classifer and SVM with radial basis function kernel to show model accuracy preservation. The SVM implementation is from LIBSVM, 3 and in our KNN implementation, we also use the kd-tree implemented in ANN library 4 to efficiently search the nearest neighbors. Twelve UCI machine learning data sets are used in experiments. Each data set is duplicated 10 times to generate a larger data set. Then, we randomly split them into several random-sized subdata sets, simulating the distributed data sets from the data providers. In our experiments, we also simulate two special partition distributions: the class-biased partition and the uniform partition (as illustrated in Figs. 5 and 6 ) for the distributed data sets. In some experiments, we will choose to show the detailed results of a few featured data sets: Diabetes data set that has an unclear geometric class boundary (KNN with accuracy about 73 percent), Shuttle data set that has geometrically well-separated three major classes and a few tiny classes (KNN with accuracy about 99 percent), and Votes data set that is a Boolean data set.
The proposed protocols will use two types of algorithms to generate perturbations: randomized and optimized. Randomly generated perturbation means that the three components R, É, and Á are randomly generated. The rotation component R is generated from the QR decomposition [19] of a uniform random matrix; the elements of É is uniformly selected from the range [À1; 1]; the elements in Á are i.i.d drawn from Nð0; 0:1 2 Þ. The optimization algorithm [7] mainly optimizes the rotation component R, while the other two components are generated in the same way as in the randomized method. The simple protocol will share a randomly generated perturbation by sharing the same randomization seed, which is generated from the shared group key with some hashing function. In the negotiation protocol, each party will generate its own locally optimized perturbation as the baseline for calculating the satisfaction level. In the space adaptation protocol, each party calculates the shared target perturbation G t with the group key, and then generates its own locally optimized G i . The rotation component and the translation component of the adaptor G i!t can be calculated with G t and G i using the formula:
Random Perturbation versus Optimized Perturbation
Local optimization gives significantly better perturbation than randomly generated perturbations in terms of privacy guarantee [5] , [7] . Certainly, all parties will like to preserve the gain of privacy guarantee, i.e., preferring their locally optimized perturbations, when attending the multiparty collaborative mining. In this section, we show the difference between optimized perturbations and randomly generated perturbations in terms of cost and benefit, justifying that some costly protocols such as the negotiation protocol has its value in certain applications. We use the three typical data sets in the experiments. For each data set, we generate 1,000 perturbations with randomization and with optimization, respectively. Since the optimization process is also randomized against the attacks to the algorithm itself, the privacy guarantee of the generated perturbations will also show certain randomness. In Figs. 7, 8, and 9 , the x-axis is the minimum privacy guarantee of the perturbation as defined in Section 2.1, and the y-axis is the number of perturbations having the corresponding privacy guarantee. These three figures show that optimized perturbations often have significantly higher privacy guarantee than randomly generated perturbations. Fig. 6 . Class-biased partition of the pooled data.
Efficiency of Negotiation
Since the interactions between parties are straightforward in the simple protocol and the space adaptation protocol, the formal analysis of time complexity is sufficient. However, the negotiation protocol involves the number of negotiation rounds, which the formal analysis cannot determine. We believe that the setting of minimum satisfaction level s min has an intuitive impact on the success rate of negotiation. Besides that, we also notice that partition distribution can affect the efficiency of negotiation. We choose to show the results of the three typical data sets here with the setting of five-party collaborative mining (five data providers). Figs. 10 and 11 show the average results of 10 tests for each data set, each partition distribution, and each setting of minimum satisfaction level. We use 50 rounds as the upper limit of the number of rounds doing negotiation, i.e., if the parties cannot agree on any good perturbation in 50 rounds, we simply stop it:
success rate ¼ # successful negotiations 50 :
Note that class-based partition has more impact on the Votes data set (Boolean) than the other two data sets, possibly due to the type of data. In addition, with a little relaxation on the minimum satisfaction level, the negotiation protocol is pretty efficient. For example, for uniform partition, if s min is relaxed from 1 to 0.8, the success rate rises from almost 0 to around 60-90 percent. On the other hand, it is a little more difficult to agree on a good perturbation for class-based partition, since each subset has very different distributions, which should result in different optimal perturbation. In particular, the success rate for Votes data increases slowly from 0 to 20 percent when s min is relaxed to 0.8. Most importantly, Fig. 12 shows that the relaxation of minimum satisfaction level does not significantly affect the average of the privacy guarantees from all parties, which implies that it will be safe and efficient to relax the minimum satisfaction level in a small range, e.g., [0. 8, 1] .
So far, we have not touched the scalability issue. The negotiation protocol seemly works pretty efficient for a small number of data providers. What if the number of parties increases? Fig. 14 shows that with increasing number of parties, the effect to the performance of negotiation is not trivial. In general, class-based partition results in much worse performance. For example, the increase of parties makes the agreement of Votes/class-based partition quickly become very difficult. In contrast, with uniform partition, the negotiation for the Votes data is still quite efficient, a successful negotiation happens in about 2-3 rounds, on average, at 10 parties. Overall, the efficiency of negotiation is seemly determined by both the class distribution of the pooled data set and the partition distribution of the distributed data sets.
Satisfaction Level to Unified Perturbation
One of the major metrics in perturbation unification is the satisfaction level of privacy guarantee. We have used it in the evaluation of the negotiation protocol. We will further compare the overall satisfaction levels between the negotiation protocol and the other two protocols, which are based on randomly generated unified perturbations. Fig. 13 shows the comparison. We show the average of minimum/maximum satisfaction level together with the average satisfaction level among all parties. For the negotiation protocol, if we set the minimum satisfaction level to 0.8 for five parties, the resultant satisfaction level is quite high-on average, it is above 0.9 which confirms the observed pattern in Fig. 12 . At least one party gets perfect satisfaction level 1.0 or even higher. A satisfaction level higher than 1 can happen because the local perturbation optimization algorithm is a hill climbing algorithm, which does not guarantee to get the best perturbation. In some cases, a perturbation from another party might be better than the one optimized locally. Interestingly, although the minimum satisfaction level from randomly generated unified perturbations is lower than that from the negotiation protocol, the average is reasonably high. Moreover, most of the parties keep more than 50 percent of their original privacy guarantee, and some parties may even get satisfaction level higher than 1. A global perturbation may give higher privacy guarantee than a locally optimized perturbation in both negotiation or random cases, which indicates some space for us to improve in the future in terms of privacy guarantee.
Preservation of Data Utility
We finalize the experiments with the study of data utility for the two representative classifiers: KNN classifier and SVM classifier with RBF kernel. One of the major trade-offs in privacy preserving data mining is that between data utility (or model accuracy in the classification case) and privacy guarantee. However, most of this paper has been focused on the efficiency of protocols and privacy guarantee (or risk of privacy breach). In fact, all protocols we discussed so far do not involve factors that can significantly downgrade the quality of the pooled data set. In other words, data utility should be ideally as good as that in the single-party perturbation. The nuance may come from the perturbation of the noise component in the space adaptation protocol. According to (1) , space adaptation will not change the intensity of noise component either. We will study this in experiments.
The pooled data sets generated by the simulation of protocols are used to train the two kinds of classifiers: KNN and SVM. The numbers in Figs. 15 and 16 show the deviation from the standard accuracy which is obtained with the original unperturbed data set. These numbers are the average of 10 rounds of randomized protocol simulation-in each round, data are split randomly (according to different partition distributions), and all local optimizations are done in a randomized manner. A negative number means that the actual accuracy is reduced. We use "SP," "NP," and "SAP" to represent the three protocols, respectively. The results of different partition distributions for the space adaptation protocol are labeled with "SAP-Uniform" and "SAP-Class." The result shows that partition distributions and protocols do not make significantly different impact on the accuracy, while SAP may have slightly more negative impact on some data sets. Therefore, the only factor is data itself, i.e., the class distribution, which is different from data set to data set.
RELATED WORK
Data perturbation changes the data in such a way that it is difficult to estimate the original values from the perturbed data, while some of the properties of the data set critical to data mining are still preserved. Recently, data perturbation techniques have become popular for privacy-preserving data mining [2] , [9] , [1] , [22] , [5] due to the relatively low cost to deploy them compared to the cryptographic techniques [17] , [23] , [24] , [15] , [13] . However, there are a few challenges in the data-perturbation-based privacypreserving data mining. First, it is commonly recognized that it is critical but difficult to balance data utility (affecting the model accuracy in the classification case) and data privacy. Second, potential attacks to the data perturbation methods are not sufficiently considered in previous research. A few works have started to address the privacy breaches to randomization approaches, by applying data reconstruction techniques [7] , [12] , [16] or the domain knowledge [8] . Third, some approaches, such as randomization approach [2] , require to develop new data mining algorithms to mine the perturbed data, which raise extra difficulty in applying these techniques. To address these challenges, it is critical to understand the intrinsic relationship between data mining models and the perturbation techniques.
The previous work [5] , [7] has investigated the perturbation techniques from the perspective of the specific data mining models. The authors observed that different data mining tasks/models actually care about different properties of the data set, which could be statistical information, such as the column distribution and the covariance matrix, geometric properties, such as distance, and so on. Clearly, it is almost impossible to preserve all of the information in the original data set in data perturbation. Thus, perturbation techniques should focus on preserving only the task-specific information in the data set that is critical to the specific data mining task/ model, in order to bring better flexibility in optimizing data privacy guarantee. The initial study on the geometric perturbation approach to data classification [5] has shown that the task-/model-specific data perturbation can provide better privacy guarantee and better model accuracy. Liu et al. [18] also discussed the scenarios where a general multiplicative data perturbation is applied. However, such perturbation may not preserve the model accuracy well for the classifiers we have mentioned.
Data perturbation is particularly good for a single data owner publishing his/her own data. It may raise particular issues when applied to multiparty collaborative mining. Recent research [27] , [2] also mentioned the service-oriented framework for collaborative privacy-preserving data mining with data perturbation. Another branch of multiparty privacy-preserving data mining is derived from the basic idea of secure multiparty computation (SMC) [25] . The generic SMC protocols are costly, and thus, only applicable for small data. Lindell and Pinkas [17] propose a protocol for efficiently computing mutual information from two-party distributed sources, which is the basis of ID3 decision tree algorithm [20] . Jagannathan and Wright [13] propose the cryptographic protocol for two-party secure K-means clustering. Therefore, a few more protocols are proposed [24] , [26] for different data mining algorithms on vertically partitioned data sets. However, all of them are attached to certain data mining algorithm and not easy to extend to other data mining algorithms. Furthermore, most of them are two-party protocols. By increasing the number of parties, either the communication cost will increase exponentially or the original protocol does not work anymore. In contrast, our geometricperturbation-based approach can be applied to multiple categories of mining algorithms with good scalability. We have reported some of the preliminary result, primarily on space adaptation [6] . In this paper, we present more protocols with a comprehensive evaluation.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Geometric perturbation has shown to be an effective perturbation method in single-party privacy-preserving data publishing. In this paper, we present the geometric perturbation approach to multiparty privacy-preserving collaborative mining. The main challenge is to securely unify the perturbations used by different participants without much loss of privacy guarantee and data utility. We designed three protocols and analyzed the features and the cost of each protocol. The main factors and trade-offs are also studied in the experiments. Overall, the space adaptation protocol provides a better balance between scalability, flexibility of data distribution, and the overall satisfaction level of privacy guarantee. For a small number of collaborative parties, we can also use the negotiation protocol which can provide better overall satisfaction level with some more communication cost. The three protocols described in this paper represent our first effort on applying geometric data perturbation to multiparty privacy-preserving mining. Our work continues along several dimensions. First, it is known that, often, when the attacker knows where the breached information comes from, the damage becomes more substantial. We are interested in investigating the anonymization factor in the protocol design to further enhance the privacy preservation. Second, our current protocols assume that the service provider and the data providers do not collude. We are interested in investigating the challenging situation where this assumption is relaxed. Third, as the experimental result shows, the negotiation protocol can improve the overall privacy guarantee significantly. Therefore, it is meaningful to improve the negotiation protocol by seeking better balance between the satisfaction level and the efficiency of the protocol. Finally, in the current framework, we consider only the setting of one service provider and multiple data providers. We are interested in studying the privacy and security issues in the situation where multiple service providers collaboratively providing the privacy-preserving mining service to multiple data providers. Keke he developed a few well-known research prototypes, such as the VISTA visual cluster rendering and validation system, the iVIBRATE framework for largescale visual data clustering, the "Best K" cluster validation method for categorical data clustering, and the geometric data perturbation approach for service-oriented privacy-preserving data mining. From 2006 to 2008, he was a senior research scientist in Yahoo! Search&Ads Science, working on research issues in international Web search relevance and developing advanced data mining algorithms for large distributed data sets on the Cloud. He is a member of the IEEE. . For more information on this or any other computing topic, please visit our Digital Library at www.computer.org/publications/dlib.
